When our countless mobile devices connect to the nearest cell tower, communication occurs over the radio access network (RAN). The RAN facilitates air interface connections to the tower, which then routes signals via fibre or wireless backhaul to the heart (core) of the telecommunication network.
Traditionally, RANs have been proprietary in nature, integrated solely with individual equipment manufacturers' systems (like Ericsson, Nokia, Huawei, etc.). So, in a typical MNO's dream, they pay an insane amount of money to the vendor, then unpack a huge delivery box(s), turn the key and magically everything works. At least in theory. Truth or not, it's all in the past.
In contrast, Open RAN (or: O-RAN) supports interoperability through standardised interfaces that enable network operators to incorporate multi-vendor sub-components like remote radio heads and distributed units. This new architecture aims to achieve three primary objectives.
This shift to disaggregated and interoperable RAN architectures inevitably introduces more flexibility and choice. However, it also seriously complicates network configurations due to the integration of many varied third-party elements, of course, coming from different vendors. As a result, the "default" security risk profile for wireless networking is severely altered under O-RAN deployments, with orchestration and segmentation challenges that previously did not exist within closed, proprietary implementations.
I think no one is surprised that there was someone who desired to put it all in order. And this heavy job was taken by the O-RAN Alliance - a group of mobile operators, vendors and researchers working to define that whole open and intelligent RAN ecosystem. The Alliance develops standards and specifications for open interfaces between network components to facilitate that much-needed multi-vendor interoperability. It also establishes reference architectures and designs for O-RAN elements. I say they are generally doing a really good job and deliver tons of useful documentation. However, we should also admit that this task is complex and all the standards go through an iterative process, sometimes lagging behind the urgent needs of the telecommunication industry. And this leaves some space for (hopefully constructive) critique. In 2021, Germany's Federal Cyber Security Authority conducted a risk assessment of the O-RAN Alliance's standards and architectural framework. Their analysis considered requirements around confidentiality, integrity, accountability, availability and privacy from the perspective of end users, network operators, and national interests. Surprisingly (or not), the results indicated e.g., that some interfaces and components specified in O-RAN could have almost immediately introduced various medium to high-security risks "by design"! Also, well-known zero-trust and "security by design" practices also did not seem to factor strongly enough into the specifications. But, luckily, everything evolves and the existing O-RAN specifications in 2023 are much more robust and truly leading the way.
In 2022 EU published a report on the security of O-RAN. The report outlined some potential risks, such as, e.g., a much wider attack surface resulting from the disaggregated architecture. With more vendors and interfaces involved, this means that there are increased opportunities for exploitation. Additionally, the O-RAN components could have various misconfiguration issues and those flaws may have greater impacts as well, given the shared infrastructure approach and resource pooling across network functions. Not surprisingy, this time, the report also raised concerns about O-RAN security not being sufficiently prioritised from the beginning. Some researchers are even attributing this to slower O-RAN adoption in Europe, e.g., compared to Japan.
Let's summarize the key O-RAN security risks.
Follow the cybersecurity best practices. The EU has released several documents in recent years highlighting cybersecurity challenges for next-generation telecommunications infrastructure, such as EU Toolbox and various subsequent risk reports (google: 5G ENISA). All of them called attention to issues that will need ongoing mitigation as 5G networks evolve. Security concerns related to Open RAN architectures are actively being evaluated both within standards development forums as well as broader industry discussions. The security risks could be greatly reduced if the best practices are in place, such as security by design, adopting compliance standards, conducting regular risk assessments, configuration management, minimizing attack surface area, proper patch management, monitoring and logging and incident response planning.
Control your supply chain and buy O-RAN components from trusted vendors only. Let's start from this: leading vendors always invest heavily in security R&D and integrate defences proactively into new product designs. "Security-by-design" is not just a nice slogan for them. Trusted vendors also are much less likely to accidentally introduce malware or backdoors in hardware/software components during development and manufacturing. This automatically reduces many supply chain risks. Established vendors typically have dedicated security teams and processes for identifying vulnerabilities and issuing patches/updates - this level of security maturity is lacking in some smaller component makers. Last but not least: trusted vendors also follow international security standards and regulations. Their components are more likely to be compliant with requirements regarding privacy, encryption, authentication etc. out of the box.
Conduct thorough and regular security assessments. This means regular penetration testing aiming to find weaknesses before attackers can at the device level, assembled subsystems and system levels. Penetration testing can greatly help to improve O-RAN security by ticking these boxes:
While the benefits of O-RAN in terms of flexibility, optimisation, and cost savings are undeniable, it is critical that network operators and other stakeholders carefully consider the cybersecurity challenges that an open and virtualised architecture introduces. As we have discussed, the multi-vendor ecosystem, reliance on cloud infrastructure, use of open-source code, and increased complexity all contribute to a larger potential attack surface. However, by enforcing best practices many of these risks can be successfully mitigated. Those who embrace O-RAN by prioritising security from the start will be best positioned to reap the rewards of innovation while ensuring the resilient defence of their precious critical network infrastructure. As they used to say in Polish: "przezorny zawsze ubezpieczony" or "forewarned is forearmed".
As the hype (oh sorry, better call it: general excitement) around 5G continues to grow, the network of the future seems poised to change telecommunications forever and in a good way. However, as with any new technology, 5G also introduces new risks that could undermine its potential if not properly addressed. In the series of articles I want us to find out what those risks are and how to deal with them before it's too late.
5G is indeed thought to be a new market force, bringing wireless connectivity to billions more devices. Its massive machine-type communication capabilities alone have the potential to power new IoT use cases we can barely imagine today. But the scale and hyper-connectivity of 5G networks also mean new avenues for threat actors to exploit.
Some could say: read the specs! The security is "embedded in 5G" from the ground. The new architecture utilises a myriad of security features implemented throughout the whole network. User data and signalling traffic traversing both the control plane overseeing network operations and the user plane carrying subscriber data are encrypted. Encryption is also applied to subscriber identities and interfaces between network components. Additionally, 5G SA mandates Transport Layer Security (TLS) encryption and authentication for communication between different mobile network operators. So is there a problem here? Yes, there is: take a look.
For example, 5G network functions (NFs) are software-based and come from many different vendors. Those NFs will certainly introduce vulnerabilities if patches or security updates are not correctly (and promptly) applied. New authentication mechanisms, mandated by the 3GPP standard, may also require strengthening to prevent unauthorized access, e.g. to core network slices. On the RAN side, open interfaces in OpenRAN architectures could expose control planes if not properly firewalled and segmented. There are also concerns around supply chain integrity as 5G infrastructure is sourced globally. Without robust vetting and oversight of contracting parties, could certain components become vehicles for embedding hidden vulnerabilities or backdoors? Well, supply chain security would surely require a separate long and interesting conversation.
But this is not the end of the story. 5GC introduces even more risks due to its use of open HTTP/2-based APIs, and a large number of dynamically scalable microservices within each NF that talk to each other primarily through public interfaces rather than proprietary protocols. While this architecture features cloud-native technologies and speeds up development and remediation, - at the same time it also provides many more familiar attack vectors for malicious actors. To maintain resilience against both intentional and unintentional threats mobile operators must start thinking now about how to improve security measures across their 5GC systems. There is one more reason for it: new draconian legislation in Europe and in the UK. If things go wrong - the poor telco has to pay a fine of up to 2% of the global yearly revenue (I am referring to NIS 2, as you might rightfully guess). Indeed, this gives some food for thought. The stakes are high as operators have to deal with challenges that substantially exceed any risks faced in earlier cellular generations.
In my humble opinion, the only reasonable approach is to make security testing not optional but mandatory for all 5G network functions, configurations and software deployments. This should include regular penetration testing aiming to find weaknesses before attackers can at the device level, assembled subsystems and system levels. Similarly, paying more attention to stringent authentication, access controls and network segmentation now becomes imperative considering that 5G networks are much more distributed and complex.
While 5G's arrival will undoubtedly transform industries and economies, its security implications demand close attention and ongoing hardening efforts. Only by proactively identifying and remediating vulnerabilities we all can maximize the benefits of 5G and ensure that crucial infrastructures of tomorrow remain resilient against evolving threats.
Step back in time with us as we take you to the Shuttleworth exhibition of iconic car and air display, where history comes alive amidst the thrill of speed! This truly unique event is a must-see for any enthusiast of vintage motoring and aviation. Witness some of the world's most extraordinary antique cars - sleek pre-war racing machines, elegant Rolls-Royces, and even some of the first ever Fords - take to the track in a display of precision driving that will leave you breathless. Meanwhile, above the ground, an equally impressive array of vintage aircraft, from biplanes to monoplanes, showcase the incredible craftsmanship and innovation of early aviation. Every vehicle on show has been meticulously restored to its former glory, offering a rare glimpse into an era when technology and beauty went hand in hand. Let us take you through this captivating collection of photographs capturing every detail of these magnificent machines in action.
The annual Burghley Horse Trials, a premier three-day event that has captivated the equestrian world since its inception in 1961. Set amidst the stunning surroundings of Burghley House Estate in Lincolnshire, England, this cross country competition brings together the finest horse and rider combinations from across the globe to face a gruelling yet breathtaking course of natural obstacles set against an unparalleled backdrop of English countryside beauty. The event has a unique atmosphere that cannot be matched anywhere else on earth - where horses are pushed to their limits amidst the unspoiled landscape, creating a spectacle of raw power, skill and elegance. With its challenging terrain and majestic setting, it is little wonder that Burghley continues to captivate both competitors and spectators alike. This blog gallery will take you through the key moments from each year's event, showcasing the artistry and prowess of both horse and rider as they navigate this treacherous yet beautiful course. Join us on a journey through the highs and lows, triumphs and tribulations of Burghley Cross Country - an event that truly has no equal in the equestrian world.
Probably I should have published this news much earlier, but as they say, "better late than never". So here we go: I am delighted to announce that Metro Ethernet Forum (MEF) formally issued Draft Release 1 of MEF Secure SD-WAN Certification Test Requirements (MEF 131). As a nominated editor, I was leading this project for a year, and happy to see that now it has been released.
A quick intro to SD-WAN: it is an acronym for Software-Defined Wide Area Networking. It is a networking paradigm that promises to change the way we think about networking. In a nutshell, SD-WAN technology is a software-defined solution that allows the network to be centrally managed. This leads to a whole new way of designing, deploying and managing the network that is less complex, more flexible, and more user-friendly. The SD-WAN solutions are based on a suite of software and hardware components and can be deployed on various platforms and technologies. SD-WAN delivers a flexible and cost-effective infrastructure to support a unified data centre in the cloud where all applications and servers can reside and interconnect with the network and each other, resulting in lower Total Cost of Ownership and simplified network architectures. At the same time, it is important to know that the last thing you want is when yours or your customers’ data is compromised due to an insecure network, so it is imperative to have a clear understanding of how SD-WAN should be secured before going live.
Now a bit more about the document. MEF 131 describes the certification test requirements needed to verify that a service conforms to MEF 88, which outlines requirements for Application Flow Security for SD-WAN Services. The requirements in MEF 88 have been analyzed to determine which ones are valuable and testable, and this standard outlines the certification test requirements for those requirements. This standard also includes the ACTP Test Plan and ACTP Test Report, which specify the detailed test requirements and test cases, respectively. MEF 88 requirements were mapped to a set of Test Cases:
Each Test Case can cover one or more MEF 88 Requirements. This is possible due to the fact that each Test Case can have one or more Tests. There is no mandatory direct relationship between the number of Tests and related Requirements, as one Test can cover more than one MEF 88 Requirement.
It was a very interesting project, and I am happy to have a chat with you if you want to know more about it and also learn a thing or two about the cybersecurity of SD-WAN.
So the document is publicly available, and I think it is a good time to say thank you for the tremendous support: my colleagues from Spirent Communications and also from MEF members.
You know, I don't write about politics. On the contrary, I stay away from it as far as possible. But maybe this is the time to break the rule, so let me share a few thoughts.
Two days ago, I was attending the Mobile World Congress in beautiful Barcelona. While walking amongst hundreds of much-too-much overexcited geeks, businessmen and demonstrations of all the unimaginable advances of the "technologies of tomorrow," one thought came to me: what all of it is worth if there is no tomorrow? It was such a strange, surreal feeling. Like being on the stage of the beginning of an apocalyptic movie, where everything looks completely fine, but the viewer is already anticipating that actually, the peace is hanging on a very thin thread...
We are a generation of people who do not know war. If we hear about wars, it is only a bunch of pictures on our TV screen. They are so far from us, so it all looks completely harmless. It does not resonate much inside with anything we've ever experienced before. "These are someone else's problems," we think and continue drinking our morning coffee. Well, it seems we all are in a bit different situation now. And if this situation is not resolved - I am afraid there will be no 5G, no augmented reality, no smart and self-driving cars and mobile phones. The whole civilised humanity will rapidly tumble down from the higher levels of Maslow's pyramid to the very bottom, where we will face nothing but endless basic survival.
Whether we like it or not, it seems the faith of the future might be decided on the streets and fields of the country, which (what an irony!) is the largest in Europe, but not everyone in the world could have pointed at on the map. But now everyone can. Because it is so much clear now that Ukrainians are not fighting only for their motherland. It's about all of us. So we can live in peace, continue to develop science, advance technology and, first of all: so nobody on Earth will ever be afraid of tomorrow.
Many say that these days "information is a weapon". And this type of support is also what Ukraine desperately needs. The global tech industry and hundreds of IT activists are already helping and supporting the freedom of information, which is phenomenal. I think this is desperately needed on both sides of the barricade. I also think it is very important that not only the giants of the tech industry but all of us: IT business professionals, not stay aside from the situation. We all should do what we can to support by any means the fight for the freedom of Ukraine. It's not their fight. It's our fight. Fight the future of the whole civilised world: the world of peace, the world as we really want it to be.